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Abstract
 
We examine whether firms that capitalize a higher proportion of their underlying
intangible assets have higher analyst following, lower dispersion of analysts’
earnings forecasts and more accurate earnings forecasts relative to firms that
capitalize a lower proportion. Under Australian generally accepted accounting
principles, capitalization of intangible assets has become increasingly ‘routine’
since the late 1980s. It is predicted that this experience leads Australian analysts to
expect firms with relatively more certain intangible investments to signal this
fact by capitalizing intangible assets. Our results are consistent with this. We
find that capitalization of intangible assets is associated with higher analyst fol-
lowing and lower absolute earnings forecast error for firms with a stock of
underlying intangible assets. Our tests suggest a weaker association between
capitalization and lower earnings forecast dispersion. We conclude that there
are benefits for analysts, for management to have the option to capitalize intan-
gible assets. These findings suggest that IAS 38 
 
Intangible Assets
 
 and AASB
138 
 
Intangible Assets
 
 reduce the usefulness of financial statements.
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1. Introduction
 
We examine whether firms that capitalize a higher proportion of their under-
lying intangible assets have higher analyst following, lower dispersion of ana-
lysts’ earnings forecasts and more accurate earnings forecasts relative to other
firms. The present study is conducted in a setting wherein capitalization of
intangible assets is common. In the US setting, where most intangible assets are
unrecognized, it has been shown that analysts make larger earnings forecast
errors for firms with higher underlying intangibles (Barron 
 
et al
 
., 2002; Demers,
2002). In this latter setting, it has also been shown that analyst following is
higher for firms with higher underlying, mostly unrecognized intangible assets
(Barth 
 
et al
 
., 2001). Because analysts select firms to cover based on their
expectations of the firm’s performance prospects (McNichols and O’Brien,
1997; Francis and Willis, 2001), this evidence suggests that analysts prefer
firms with higher intangibles because they expect these firms to outperform
firms with lower intangibles. So far, there is no known evidence on the effects
of capitalization on these relationships when management has the option to cap-
italize intangible assets. The present paper addresses this gap.
This study is conducted in the Australian generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) setting, wherein capitalization of intangible assets has been
‘routine’ since the late 1980s (Wines and Ferguson, 1993). Australian managers and
analysts have experience in communicating and processing this information. This
experience potentially leads Australian analysts to expect firms with relatively more
certain intangible investments to signal this fact by capitalizing intangible assets.
To formulate testable predictions, we draw on recent evidence from the Australian
setting that the firm’s underlying economics motivates management’s choices to
capitalize intangible assets (Wyatt, 2005). This evidence suggests management
is capitalizing when their firm has more certain intangible investments. We
expect this helps analysts to distinguish firms with more and less certain underlying
intangible assets. Hence, if analysts prefer to follow firms expected to perform
favourably in the future (McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Francis and Willis,
2001), and analysts believe intangible assets predict favourable performance
(Barth 
 
et al
 
., 2001), then firms with more, and less, certain intangible assets are
expected to have higher analyst following. Therefore, we hypothesize that cap-
italization of intangible assets (relative to underlying intangibles) is associated
with higher analyst following. Assuming capitalization of intangible assets
reflects more certain intangibles and, therefore, more predictable earnings, we fur-
ther hypothesize that capitalization of intangible assets is associated with lower
earnings forecast dispersion and lower absolute earnings forecast error.
Our results are consistent with these arguments. We find capitalization of
intangible assets relative to underlying intangibles is associated with higher
analyst following and lower absolute earnings forecast error for firms with a
stock of underlying intangible assets. There is much weaker association between
capitalization and lower earnings forecast dispersion.
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This study contributes new evidence to the regulatory debate on the usefulness
of the accounting option to capitalize intangible assets. The results suggest
that capitalization, on average, is an economic signal that informs financial
market intermediaries. These findings cast doubt on the quality of the restrictive
capitalization rules in IAS 38 
 
Intangible Assets
 
 and AASB 138 
 
Intangible
Assets
 
. Australia (and the European Union) committed to adopt the interna-
tional accounting standards (IFRS and IAS) on 1 January 2005. Adopting these
standards will result in a reduction of intangible assets reported on the balance
sheet because IAS 38 
 
Intangible Assets
 
 and the Australian equivalent, AASB
138 
 
Intangible Assets
 
, restrict capitalization to circumstances where there is an
exchange transaction. This will exclude most internally generated intangible
assets. This study provides evidence consistent with there being benefits for
analysts (and investors) when management has the accounting choice to capitalize
intangible assets. This evidence suggests that the constraints on the capitalization
of intangibles in IAS 38 and AASB 138 will reduce the usefulness of public
financial reporting for financial intermediaries and ultimately for investors.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Section 3
describes the research setting, sample and variables. Section 4 reports the
empirical analysis and Section 5 concludes the study.
 
2. Hypotheses development
 
We argue that supply and demand considerations jointly impact on the
relationship between analyst following and managements’ accounting choices
to capitalize intangible assets (see Bhushan, 1989; Alford and Berger, 1999;
Frankel 
 
et al
 
., 2002). On the demand side, the literature suggests that these
forces include analysts’ incentives to search out information to identify and
follow firms expected to perform favourably in the future (McNichols and
O’Brien, 1997; Francis and Willis, 2001). On the supply side, the literature
suggests that management has ‘cost of capital’-related incentives to supply
information that attracts analysts to follow the firm (Trueman, 1986).
 
2.1. Analyst following and capitalization of intangible assets
 
In the US setting, where most intangible assets are unrecognized, it has been
shown that analyst following is higher for firms with higher underlying, mostly
unrecognized intangible assets (Barth 
 
et al
 
., 2001). It has also been shown that
analysts select firms to cover based on their expectations of the firms’ performance
prospects (McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Francis and Willis, 2001). Following
‘good’ firms reduces the risk the analysts lose underwriting business for their
investment bank, or lose broking firm clients, by issuing pessimistic earnings
forecasts and ‘sell’ recommendations. Taken together, this evidence suggests
that analysts prefer firms with higher intangibles because they expect these
firms to outperform firms with lower intangibles in the future.
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This interpretation is consistent with the evidence that intangible assets predict
future earnings, on average. Kohlbeck and Warfield (2002) show that including
estimates of unrecorded intangible assets in the residual income valuation
model improves the model’s performance. This result is due to a positive asso-
ciation between the level of the firm’s (mostly unrecognized) intangible assets and
future abnormal earnings. Similarly, Sougiannis and Yaekura (2001) find biases
and inaccuracies from long (4-year) -horizon, earnings-based valuation models.
Their evidence suggests one cause of these biases is omitted intangible assets
from the balance sheet and the concurrent biases in earnings forecast inputs to
the valuation model. Ritter and Wells (2006) provide consistent evidence from the
Australian setting. They find that the reported intangible assets of Australian com-
panies are significantly positively associated with future earnings and stock prices.
There is complementary evidence from the Australian setting that managers
are making capitalization choices for intangible assets by reference to their firms’
underlying economics (i.e. technology strength, cycle time and property-rights-
related conditions) (Wyatt, 2005). This evidence implies that capitalized intangible
assets are useful information for distinguishing firms with more or less certain
underlying intangible assets. Moreover, in the Australian setting, wherein capi-
talization of intangibles is routine, it is probable that analysts expect firms with
more certain intangibles to capitalize the assets. Accordingly, analysts’ expecta-
tions of the firms’ future performance is higher for firms capitalizing more of
their underlying intangible assets. Therefore, we hypothesize that capitalization
of intangible assets relative to underlying intangible assets is associated with
higher analyst following.
 
H
 
1
 
: Capitalization of intangible assets relative to total underlying intangible
assets is positively related to analyst following.
 
An additional consideration is the extent to which firms have a stock of intangible
assets versus mainly assets in place. It is unlikely that analysts expect to see, or
rely on, capitalization for firms with no or low stocks of intangible assets.
Intangibles-rich companies have higher upside earnings potential as well as
higher downside risk compared to other firms (Chung and Charoenwong, 1991).
Therefore, we expect the capitalization signal to be more beneficial in inform-
ing and attracting analysts for firms with higher underlying intangible assets.
 
2.2. Analysts’ earnings forecast, and capitalization of intangible assets
 
The evidence from the Australian setting suggests that capitalization of
intangible assets on average reflects more predictable earnings compared to
firms with less certain underlying intangible assets that do not capitalize (Ritter and
Wells, 2004; Wyatt, 2005). Hypothesis 2 therefore predicts that higher capital-
ization of intangible assets relative to underlying intangible assets is associated with
lower earnings forecast dispersion and lower absolute earnings forecast error.
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This prediction is in the opposite direction from the US evidence on the
intangible assets link to analyst forecast properties. For a US sample, Gu and
Wang (2003) find a positive relation between forecast errors and the complexity
and levels of (mostly unrecorded) underlying intangibles. Barron 
 
et al
 
. (2002)
find that analysts make larger forecast errors for firms with higher intangibles
(see Demers, 2002). These studies suggest that analysts find US firms’ underlying
intangible assets difficult to evaluate, thereby reducing the accuracy of the
analysts’ earnings forecasts. In contrast, Australian managers have the option to
capitalize intangible assets, and analysts have experience with these disclosures.
Analysts have come to expect firms with more certain underlying intangibles
and associated earnings to signal this fact by capitalizing intangible assets.
Therefore, we predict the following:
 
H
 
2
 
: Capitalization of intangible assets relative to total underlying intangible
assets is associated with lower absolute analyst earnings forecast error and
lower earnings forecast dispersion.
 
The extent to which the firms have intangible assets as opposed to assets in
place is also expected to affect the relation between capitalization of intangible
assets and the analyst forecast error and forecast dispersion. Specifically, analysts
favour firms with more rather than less underlying intangible assets (Barth
 
et al
 
., 2001). However, analysts’ earnings forecasts are more dispersed and less
accurate for these firms (Barron 
 
et al
 
., 2002). We expect that capitalization
reduces these errors, and given analysts’ preference for intangibles-rich firms,
that the capitalization signal is most beneficial for informing the earnings forecasts
of firms with a higher underlying stock of intangible assets. Accordingly, we
segment the data for tests of Hypothesis 2 (and Hypothesis 1, as indicated
above) based on our proxy for total underlying intangible assets.
 
3. Research setting, sample and variable measurement
 
Table 1 summarizes the accounting options for intangibles over 1990–1997.
Compared to the US GAAP and International Accounting Standards (IFRS
and IAS), recording of intangible assets is common under Australian GAAP. In
the study period, firms were able to capitalize purchased goodwill, purchased
and internally generated identifiable intangible assets, and R&D if benefits
sufficient to offset the expenditures were expected beyond reasonable
doubt.
 
1
 
 As shown in Table 1, specific accounting standards applied to goodwill
and R&D in the 1990–1997 period. However, there was no specific standard
 
1
 
 Identifiable intangibles capitalized by Australian companies include patents, trademarks,
brands, licences, copyrights, designs, intellectual property, royalties, mastheads, other
media and publication intangibles, mineral rights, mining tenements, software, databases
and process technologies (Wyatt, 2005).
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Table 1
Summary of accounting methods for intangible assets under Australian GAAP for the 1990–1997 time periods
Intangible asset 
categories Applicable accounting standard Accounting method choices
Purchased 
goodwill
AASB 1013 Accounting for Goodwill
AASB 1015 Acquisition of Assets
Capitalize using the purchase method and amortize
Immediately expense if no benefits expected
Annual impairment test
Acquired identifiable 
intangible assets
AASB 1015 Acquisition of Assets
AASB 1010 Accounting for the 
Revaluation of Non-current Assets
Capitalize at fair value
No specific standard for identifiable intangible assets subsequent to acquisition
No specific amortization requirement in the 1990–1997 time period for intangible assets
In the 1990–1997 study period upward and downward revaluations were permitted.
Internally generated 
identifiable 
intangible assets
No specific accounting standard 
Non-mandatory guidance in SAC 4 
(Statement of Accounting Concepts 4) 
AASB 1010 Accounting for the 
Revaluation of Non-current Assets
Under SAC 4, an asset is future economic benefits controlled by the entity as a result of 
past transactions or other past events. It permits recognition when (a) it is probable future 
economic benefits embodied in the asset will eventuate, and (b) the asset possesses a cost 
or other value that can be measured reliably.
 No specific amortization requirement in the 1990–1997 time period for intangible assets 
In the 1990–1997 study period upward and downward revaluations were permitted.
Research and 
Development
AASB 1011 Accounting for 
Research and Development
Capitalize if benefits expected to exceed costs beyond reasonable doubt, otherwise 
immediately expense.
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regulating identifiable intangible assets, providing a voluntary choice to capitalize.
Moreover, while AASB 1013, 
 
Accounting for Goodwill
 
, expressly prohibited
capitalization of internally generated goodwill, there is no clear cut-off between
internally generated goodwill and identifiable intangible assets (Anderson and
Zimmer, 1992).
 
2
 
 Australian managers, therefore, had discretion in the 1990–
1997 period to capitalize a range of intangible assets. Wyatt (2005) finds that
approximately 68 per cent of a diverse (across industries and size) sample of
1366 firm-years report intangible assets over 1993–1997. The setting is, there-
fore, unique in facilitating research on accounting choices for intangible assets.
 
3.1. Sample and data
 
The sample comprises listed firms with analyst following and earnings
forecast data available between 1990 and 1997 on the Barclays Australasia
Consensus Earnings Profile (BARCEP) file. These firms are scattered across 23
industries as relationships examined are expected to be relevant across indus-
tries. Financial accounting data are obtained from the FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
ON CD database. Firms on the BARCEP file are excluded if financial informa-
tion is not available on the FINANCIAL ANALYSIS ON CD database. Our final
sample with the required analyst following and earnings forecast data is an
unbalanced panel of 421 annual observations. The observations per year within
the 8 year study period 1990–1997 range from 27 to 79 companies.
 
3.2. Measurement of experimental and dependent variables
 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables.
There are 291 sample firms (69 per cent) capitalizing intangible assets. The
mean intangible assets are small (the mean (median) intangibles/total assets is
6 per cent (1 per cent)). Hence, consistent with prior studies (Ritter and Wells,
2004; Wyatt, 2005), not all firms capitalize and the magnitude capitalized is
small on average.
The experimental variable, 
 
INTANG/MVAD
 
, is capitalized intangible assets
divided by a proxy for the firm’s underlying intangible investments: market
value added (
 
MVAD
 
) which is [market value of equity – (book value of equity
– intangible assets)]. Chung and Charoenwong (1991), Smith and Watts (1992)
and more recently Cohen 
 
et al.
 
 (2001) provide support for the use of this measure
of underlying intangible assets.
 
3
 
 The numerator of 
 
INTANG/MVAD
 
 comprises
 
2
 
 An earlier attempt to regulate intangible assets, ED 49 
 
Accounting for Identifiable Intan-
gible Assets
 
 was issued in August 1989 and withdrawn in March 1992 amid torrid debate.
 
3
 
 Cohen 
 
et al.
 
 (2001) decompose cross-sectional variation in firms’ book-to-market ratios
using both a long US panel and a shorter international panel. They find 80 per cent of
transitory cross-sectional variation in expected 15 year stock returns can be explained by
expected 15 year profitability and persistence of valuation levels.
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Table 2
Summary statistics for the pooled sample for 1990–1997 (
 
n
 
 
 
=
 
 421)
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard deviation
 
INTANG/MVAD
 
0.18 0.02
 
−
 
6.74 15.42 0.92
 
MVAD
 
 ($million) 1120 465
 
−
 
6236 18 630 2291
 
MVAD/MV
 
0.41 0.45
 
−
 
1.39 4.02 0.42
 
MV
 
 ($million) 2659 1134 48 30 365 4183
 
FOLLOW
 
13 14 3 21 3.86
 
DISP/TA
 
0.004 0.002 0.000 0.059 0.006
 
LG(DISP/TA)
 
−
 
5.99
 
−
 
6.03
 
−
 
9.17
 
−
 
2.83 1.03
| 
 
FE
 
 |
 
/TA
 
0.010 0.002 0.000 0.270 0.027
 
LG(
 
| 
 
FE
 
 |
 
/TA)
 
−
 
6.11
 
−
 
6.01
 
−
 
13.33
 
−
 
1.31 1.83
 
OP/DEBT 0.21 0.15 −0.33 2.21 0.29
LG(MV) 7.10 7.03 3.87 10.32 1.26
AGE (in years) 21 15 3 87 19
EARNSD 82.01 24.33 0.00 748.27 161.94
LEV 0.51 0.51 0.09 0.96 0.18
σ2(RET) 0.18 0.06 0.00 1.71 0.32
∆(PRICE) 0.00 0.02 −2.02 0.95 0.36
INTANG/TA 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.78 0.14
LOSS firms 16 firm-years (3.8%)
No LOSS firms 405 firm-years (96.2%)
Capitalizers 291 firm-years (69.1%)
Non-capitalizers 130 firm-years (30.9%)
FOLLOW is the average number of analysts following firm i for year t; LG(DISP/TA) is natural log of
DISP/TA the standard deviation of analysts earnings forecasts scaled by total assets for firm i for year
t; LG(| FE |/TA) the natural log of | FE |/TA the absolute value of earnings minus the mean earnings
forecast scaled by total assets for firm i for year t; INTANG/MVAD (or INTANG/TA) is capitalized
intangible assets divided by market value added (or total assets) for firm i for year t; MVAD equals
market value equity (calculated using balance date ordinary shares and stock price) minus book value
equity which has intangible assets subtracted for firm i for year t; MVAD/MV is market value added
divided by equity market value for firm i for year t; OP/DEBT is operating cash divided by total
liabilities for firm i for year t; LG(MV) is natural log of market value equity for firm i for year t; AGE
is the number of years firm i has been listed; EARNSD is the standard deviation of reported earnings
of firm i over sample period; LEV is total liabilities divided by book value of equity; σ2(RET) equals
the variance of stock return rolling calculation over preceding and current years for each year the firm
appears in the sample within the sample period 1990–1997; ∆(PRICE) is stock price at time t minus
stock price at time t−1 divided by stock price at time t−1; LOSS is a dummy variable equal to one for
firms with earnings losses for year t and zero otherwise.
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the intangible assets reported on the face of the balance sheet. We also include
the proxy for total underlying intangible assets, as a control variable, separately
in the hypothesis tests deflated by the market value of equity (MVAD/MV). This
reflects the Barth et al. (2001) evidence of higher analyst following for firms
with higher underlying, mostly unrecognized intangible assets. Including
MVAD/MV ensures that the accounting option to report intangible assets on
the balance sheet and the firm’s total level of underlying intangible assets
are separately entered into the model, thereby facilitating tests of Hypothe-
ses 1 and 2. The evidence from the US setting suggests a positive relationship
between MVAD/MV and analyst following. In relation to analyst forecast
properties, Barron et al. (2002) find that firms with higher stocks of mainly
unrecognized intangible assets have larger forecast errors and dispersion.
This suggests a positive relationship between MVAD/MV and analyst disper-
sion and analyst forecast error. However, more intangible assets go unrecog-
nized in the US setting compared to Australia in the study period. Hence, it is
an empirical question whether these relationships are descriptive in the Austral-
ian setting.
Untabulated statistics reveal there are 43 firm-years with negative values of
the proxy for underlying intangible assets: some of which capitalize intangible
assets. Negative values of MVAD are most likely a result of falling market value
that has preceded the firm’s write-down of their intangible assets. As argued in
Section 2, it is the firms with higher intangibles, with their higher upside
earnings potential and higher downside risk, and their analysts, that stand to
benefit most from a capitalization signal. We incorporate this into the research
design by conducting the analysis for partitions on the median MVAD and the
full sample. The results are expected to be stronger for the firms with higher
underlying intangible assets (i.e. above the median of MVAD).
The dependent variable to test Hypothesis 1, FOLLOW, is the average
number of analysts following firm i in fiscal year t. FOLLOW is a count data
variable the econometric implications of which are discussed in Section 4.
Table 2 shows that at least three analysts follow each firm.
Two dependent variables are required to test Hypothesis 2. The first is the
natural logarithm of analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion deflated by total
assets, LG(DISP/TA). Dispersion is the standard deviation of the analysts’ earn-
ings forecasts for firm i for year t scaled by total assets to control for scale
effects. The second variable for tests of Hypothesis 2 is the absolute forecast
error, which is the log of the absolute value of earnings minus the mean
forecast of earnings scaled by total assets for firm i for the fiscal year t (LG(| FE |/
TA)). Consistent with prior studies, both the forecast error and forecast dispersion
are deflated to facilitate comparisons across firms in the cross-sectional analysis
(see Lang and Lundholm, 1996). The variables are logged to induce normality
and reduce influential observations in the tails of the distribution (e.g. Alford
and Berger, 1999). A negative sign is expected between analyst forecast dispersion
(LG(DISP/TA)), analyst forecast error LG(| FE |/TA), and intangible assets
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relative to market value added (INTANG/MVAD). A positive relation is expected
between FOLLOW and INTANG/MVAD.
3.3. Control variables
The hypothesis tests include control variables for the level of expected per-
formance and uncertainty. Accounting asset definition and recognition rules
make capitalization choices conditional on the uncertainty associated with
expected future earnings. Uncertainty and volatile performance also influence
analyst following, earnings forecast dispersion and forecast errors (e.g. Lang
and Lundholm, 1996; Ang and Ciccone, 2000; Ciccone, 2001). Therefore, adequate
controls for uncertainty are necessary to facilitate inferences from the tests (see
Demers, 2002).
Following the literature (see e.g. Alford and Berger, 1999; Demers, 2002),
the operating uncertainty measures include the following: operating cash flows
to debt (OP/DEBT); a proxy for firm size (the natural logarithm of the market
value of equity: LG(MV)) given large firms have higher analyst following (see
Lang and Lundholm, 1996) and generally less risky earnings; the number of
years listed (AGE); the standard deviation of earnings (EARNSD); and earnings
loss (LOSS) equal to one for firms with earnings losses in the current year and
zero otherwise. Leverage (LEV) comprising total liabilities divided by the book
value of equity reflects financial risk. The variance of stock returns (σ2(RET))
(Alford and Berger, 1999) proxies for overall uncertainty associated with future
performance, equal to a rolling measure over preceding and current years for
each year the firm appears in the sample within the sample period (1990–1997).
Change in stock price (time t price minus time t−1 price divided by t−1 price)
(∆PRICE) controls for incentives to manage earnings in response to prior stock
price movement (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2000). Finally, given the analysis is
conducted for the sample pooled cross-sectionally and over time (1990–1997),
dummy variables control for industry and year effects.
4. Empirical analysis
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, equations (1) to (3) are computed using ordinary
least square (OLS) estimators.
(1)
FOLLOW Y R INDUSTRY
INTANG MVAD MVAD MV
OP DEBT LG MV
AGE EARNSD LOSS
LEV RET
it Y
y
Z zit
z
it it
it it
it it it
it
     
                           
                           
                             
                          
= +
+ +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
= =
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(2)
(3)
Equations (2) and (3) include FOLLOW to capture variation in the relation-
ship between forecast dispersion and forecast errors and capitalization of intan-
gible assets that is a result of the correlation between INTANG/MVAD and
FOLLOW.
This highlights an endogeneity problem in the estimation of equations (1) to
(3). Management has incentives to adopt a policy of transparent reporting on
their firm’s underlying intangible investments to attract analysts. Simultaneously,
analysts demand information about underlying intangible assets because analysts
prefer firms expected to perform favourably in the future. Hence, the dependent
and independent variable(s) are jointly determined. The OLS independence
assumption is violated, biasing standard errors and significance tests. To evaluate
the impact of this endogeneity, we also report two stage least squares (2SLS)
estimates (Greene, 2000).
Analyst following
(4)
LG DISP TA YR INDUSTRY
INTANG MVAD MVAD MV
OP DEBT LG MV AGE
EARNSD LOSS LEV
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(5)
Analyst forecast dispersion
(6)
(7)
Analyst forecast error
(8)
INTANG MVAD YR INDUSTRY
INTANG TA MVAD MV
OP DEBT LG MV AGE
EARNSD LOSS LEV
RET
it Y
y
yit Z
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it it
it it it
it it it
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(9)
This approach is adopted in the literature (Alford and Berger, 1999; Barth et al.,
2001; Frankel et al., 2002). To eliminate the correlation between right-hand side
variables and the error, we need a set of instrument variables that are: (i) correlated
with the explanatory variables in the equation; and (ii) uncorrelated with the
disturbances (Greene, 2000). The instrumental variables estimation, the first
stage of the 2SLS, finds the portions of the endogenous and exogenous variables in
the prediction equation (equations (4), (6), (8) above) that are attributable to the
instrumental variables (the second equations (5), (7), (9) above). In the second
stage of the 2SLS, least squares estimates for the prediction equation are
obtained, but with the original variables replaced by the fitted values from the
first-stage estimation.
The variable selected as an instrument for the variation in analyst following
that arises from the endogenous relation between FOLLOW and INTANG/
MVAD is capitalized intangible assets to total assets (INTANG/TA). We expect
that the supply of capitalized intangible assets and the demand for this information
by analysts are jointly determined by industry and firm characteristics. As a
measure of the firm’s asset structure, this variable is correlated with the level of
the industry- and firm-specific factors that are jointly impacting on FOLLOW and
INTANG/MVAD. We satisfy the additional ‘identification’ condition by includ-
ing the right-hand side variables as instruments (Greene, 2000).4
Similarly, we use INTANG/TA as the instrument to deal with the endogeneity
between analysts’ forecast dispersion, analysts’ absolute forecast errors, and the
option to capitalize intangible assets. Again, we expect that these relations are
jointly determined by industry and firm attributes. The forecast dispersion and
error regressions include additional jointly determined instruments in the first
stage regression: FOLLOW in equations (7) and (9), and LG(DISP/TA) in equa-
tion (9) (see Alford and Berger, 1999).
4
 The specification must satisfy an order condition for identification and rank: there must be
at least as many instruments as there are coefficients in the equation (Davidson and
MacKinnon, 1993).
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A final consideration is the count data property of FOLLOW. Count data can
lead to erroneous inferences when estimated using OLS, because the dependent
variable is censored at zero and is discrete (Rock et al., 2001).5 These properties
violate the assumption that the dependent variable is continuously distributed
between −∞ and +∞, leading to improbable predicted values, biased parameter
estimates and invalid inferences (Greene, 2000). Consistent with this, Rock
et al. (2001) replicate Bhushan (1989) using a count model. They find that the
count model is preferred over the OLS using a Vuong test, and, in contrast to
Bhushan’s positive result, find a negative relationship between analyst following
and the number of institutional investors. Therefore, we also report count data
model estimates for equation (1).
4.1. Results
Table 3 reports Spearman and Pearson’s correlations.
The Spearman’s correlations between the experimental variable, INTANG/
MVAD, and FOLLOW, LG(DISP/TA), and LG(| FE |/TA) all have the predicted
signs and are significant (positive, negative and negative, respectively). The
instrument variable, INTANG/TA, is significantly correlated with the experimental
variable, INTANG/MVAD, as required for the former to be an instrument in the
2SLS.
Differences between the parametric and non-parametric correlations relate
primarily to the MVAD variable, which is non-linear in many of the other vari-
ables. For example, the parametric correlation between MVAD and INTANG/
MVAD is 3 per cent, whereas the non-parametric correlation is 36 per cent. This
non-linearity provides further support for the partitioning of the analysis on
MVAD.6
Table 4 reports the results for tests of Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive association between analyst following and
capitalization of intangibles. The theory also predicts this relationship is more
relevant for the set of firms with higher underlying intangible assets. The results
in Table 4 are consistent with these predictions. For the full sample test, the
estimated coefficient for INTANG/MVAD is positive and significant according to
the OLS and the count model estimates, but not in the 2SLS. In contrast, a
robust result is evident across all the regressions for the subset of firms with
higher underlying intangible assets (MVAD above the median). For this group
of firms, the estimated coefficient for INTANG/MVAD is positive and significant
as predicted in the OLS, 2SLS and count model. This is consistent with
5 
 Rock et al. (2001) recommend proceeding with caution if estimating count data models
using panel data.
6
 Interactions using MVAD dummy variables could also be used. However, this can induce
severe multicollinearity and complicates the regression and inferences.
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Table 3
Correlations for the pooled data (1990–1997)
Pearson’s correlations
FOLLOW
LG(DISP/
TA)
LG(|FE|/
TA)
INTANG/
MVAD
INTANG/
TA MVAD
MVAD/
MV OP_DEBT LG(MV) AGE EARN_SD LEV
σ 2
(RET) ∆PRICE
FOLLOW −0.26** −0.39** −0.10* 0.05 0.27** 0.16** −0.05 0.60** 0.14** 0.31** 0.27** −0.08 −0.01
LG(DISP/TA) −0.25** 0.64** −0.09* −0.06 −0.28** 0.06 0.40** −0.61** 0.02 −0.53** −0.68** 0.11* −0.10*
LG(| FE |/TA) −0.43** 0.58** −0.05 −0.00 −0.29** 0.12** 0.27** −0.67** −0.02 −0.51** −0.53** −0.00 0.01
INTANG/MVAD 0.24** −0.40** −0.29** 0.18** 0.03 0.09* −0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.08* 0.03 −0.01
INTANG/TA 0.15** −0.34** −0.24** 0.84** 0.12** 0.53** −0.07 0.01 −0.06 −0.11* −0.06 0.04 −0.07
MVAD 0.48** −0.40** −0.39** 0.45** 0.37** 0.39** −0.07 0.58** 0.04 0.27** 0.20** −0.02 0.06
MVAD/MV 0.07 0.04 0.13** 0.36** 0.43** 0.59** 0.09* 0.11* 0.01 −0.15** −0.05 0.01 0.07
OP_DEBT −0.09* 0.32** 0.26** −0.08 −0.05 0.01 0.23** −0.27** −0.04 −0.23** −0.46** −0.03 0.05
LG(MV) 0.61** −0.59** −0.68** 0.24** 0.19** 0.75** 0.10* −0.21** 0.10* 0.58** 0.46** −0.02 0.13**
AGE 0.17** −0.05 −0.09* 0.02 0.02 0.09* −0.10* −0.07 0.21** −0.02 0.02 −0.04 0.05
EARN_SD 0.49** −0.39** −0.48** 0.01 −0.08* 0.43** −0.17** −0.34** 0.74** 0.29** 0.60** 0.23** −0.05
LEV 0.26** −0.60** −0.49** 0.30** 0.26** 0.29** 0.01 −0.38** 0.43** 0.14** 0.39** −0.11* 0.06
σ2(RET) −0.02 0.12** 0.05 −0.17** −0.19** −0.16** −0.15** −0.06 −0.02 0.11* 0.22** −0.07 −0.29**
∆PRICE −0.07 −0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.18** 0.15** 0.15** 0.10* 0.04 −0.04 0.02 −0.04
Spearman’s correlations
INTANG/MVAD (or INTANG/TA) equals capitalized intangible assets divided by market value added (or total assets) for firm i for year t; FOLLOW is the average number
of analysts following firm i for year t; DISP/TA is the standard deviation of analysts earnings forecasts scaled by total assets for firm i for year t ; LG(DISP/TA) is natural
log of DISP/TA; | FE |/TA is the absolute value of earnings minus the mean earnings forecast scaled by total assets for firm i for year t; LG(| FE |/TA) the natural log of
| FE |/TA; MVAD equals market value equity (calculated using balance date ordinary shares and stock price) minus book value equity which has intangible assets
subtracted for firm i for year t; MVAD/MV equals market value added divided by equity market value for firm i for year t; OP/DEBT is operating cash divided by total
liabilities for firm i for year t; LG(MV) is natural log of market value equity for firm i for year t; AGE is the number of years firm i has been listed; EARN_SD is the
standard deviation of reported earnings of firm i over sample period; LEV is total liabilities divided by book value of equity; σ2(RET) equals the variance of stock return
rolling calculation over preceding and current years for each year the firm appears in the sample within the sample period 1990–1997; ∆(PRICE) is equal to stock price
at time t minus stock price at time t − 1 divided by stock price at time t − 1. One-tail significance: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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Table 4
Analyst following (FOLLOW) regressed on capitalized intangible assets divided by underlying intangible assets (INTANG/MVAD) and proxies for other factors found to 
affect analyst following (1990–1997)
Independent 
variables Sign
OLS 
Full sample
OLS 
> median 
MVAD
OLS 
< median 
MVAD
2SLS 
Full sample
2SLS 
> median 
MVAD
2SLSa 
< median 
MVAD
COUNT 
Full sample
COUNT 
> median 
MVAD
COUNT 
< median 
MVAD
INTANG/MVADit + 0.151 2.687 0.006 0.029 4.315 –1.217 0.011 0.150 –0.006(1.98)* (5.21)** (0.10) (0.03) (3.21)** (−1.03) (2.35)** (5.45)** (−1.52)
MVAD/MVit + 0.357 −1.878 0.529 0.386 −2.509 0.886 0.016 −0.112 0.016(1.09) (−4.10)** (0.71) (0.95) (−3.66)** (2.12)* (0.67) (−4.10)** (0.23)
OP/DEBTit +/− 2.289 1.014 2.548 2.287 1.299 1.943 0.173 0.045 0.217(3.51)** (1.22) (2.94)** (3.52)** (1.44) (3.30)** (3.64)** (0.93) (3.37)**
LG(MV)it + 1.980 1.131 2.592 1.980 1.248 2.905 0.140 0.071 0.242
14.13** (4.13)** (9.32)** (14.07)** (4.10)** (6.13)** (12.91)** (4.33)** (8.95)**
AGEit + 0.010 0.008 −0.009 0.010 0.008 −0.006 0.001 0.001 −0.001(1.44) (1.01) (−0.74) (1.39) (1.09) (−0.43) (2.02)* (1.00) (−0.82)
EARNSDit − –0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.364 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000(−1.54) (−1.12) (−0.90) (−1.54) (−1.45) (−1.08) (−1.87)* (−1.18) (−1.70)
LOSSit − –0.377 0.536 −1.146 −0.391 0.434 −0.511 −0.015 0.041 −0.127(−0.48) (0.92) (−1.18) (−0.49) (0.71) (−0.48) (−0.24) (1.24) (−1.59)
LEVit +/− 3.236 2.915 4.784 3.312 3.329 1.696 0.231 0.164 0.365(2.66)** (1.76) (2.42)* (2.43)* (1.90) (1.91) (2.46)* (1.65) (1.84)
σ2(RET)it − –1.592 −1.322 −1.343 −1.573 −1.392 −1.062 −0.128 −0.083 −0.170(−2.99)** (−2.33)** (−1.71) (−2.88)** (−2.31)** (−1.28) (−3.12)** (−2.46)** (−1.83)
F-statistic (probability) 23.28 (0.00) 10.75 (0.00) 8.95 (0.00) 23.18 (0.00) 9.89 (0.00) 7.18 (0.00)
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.55 0.50 0.58 0.53 0.35
Likelihood ratio 
statistic (probability)
3595 (0.00) 835 (0.00) 1904 (0.00)
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.53 0.50
aThe dispersion of the data is much greater in the ‘below the median MVAD’ subsample, leading to a poorly specified 2SLS according to the regression diagnostics (i.e.
only for the < median MVAD 2SLS). There is no valid reason to exclude the observations. Taking natural logarithms of the offending variables (MVAD/MV, OP/DEBT,
EARNSD, LEV) reduced the dispersion and rectified the specification. The inferences are the same with and without the transformations, with the exception of leverage
(LEV), which is not significant after being transformed.
INTANG/MVAD (or INTANG/TA) equals capitalized intangible assets divided by market value added (or total assets) for firm i for year t; FOLLOW is the average number
of analysts following firm i for year t; MVAD equals market value equity (calculated using balance date ordinary shares and stock price) minus book value equity which
has intangible assets subtracted for firm i for year t; MVAD/MV equals market value added divided by equity market value for firm i for year t; OP/DEBT is operating
cash divided by total liabilities for firm i for year t; LG(MV) is natural log of market value equity for firm i for year t; AGE is the number of years firm i has been listed;
EARNSD is the standard deviation of reported earnings of firm i over sample period; LOSS is a dummy variable equal to one for firms with earnings losses for year t and
zero otherwise; LEV is total liabilities divided by book value of equity; σ2(RET) equals the variance of stock return rolling calculation over preceding and current years
for each year the firm appears in the sample within the sample period 1990–1997. Reported are coefficients, t-statistics, one-tail probability where there is a signed
prediction and two-tail probability otherwise: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01). Unreported year and industry dummies are included in the estimation. 2SLS, two stage least squares;
OLS, ordinary least squares.
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Hypothesis 1. It is also consistent with the argument that the capitalization
signal is more valuable for firms with a stock of underlying intangible assets
compared to other firms.
A complementary result is observed for the level of underlying intangible
assets (MVAD/MV), a result that is robust across all specifications. This result
is a negative and significant relationship with analyst following, but again only
for the subset of firms with higher underlying intangibles. This finding, taken
with the finding for INTANGMVAD, reveals that firms with higher underlying
intangible assets are attracting a higher analyst following only if management
can capitalize intangible assets. This contrasts with the US evidence that analyst
following is higher for firms with higher underlying intangibles (Barth et al.,
2001). In effect, in the Australian setting where management has the option to
capitalize intangibles, analysts expect firms with higher underlying intangible
assets to signal their future prospects by capitalizing intangible assets. The
analyst-following preference for intangibles-rich firms is, thus, more informed,
because management has the option to capitalize when their firm’s intangibles
are more certain.
There are three other robust results in Table 4. First, analyst following is
significantly and positively associated with firm size (LG(MV)) in every regression.
This result is consistent with prior studies (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1996).
Second, for the firms with low or negative underlying intangibles (below the
median MVAD), the estimated coefficient for operating cash flows to debt is
always positive and significant. This suggests analysts follow these firms because
they are mature ‘cash cows’. Third, for the firms with the higher underlying
intangible assets (above the median MVAD), there is a significant, negative rela-
tionship between analyst following and the variance of stock returns, as in prior
studies (Alford and Berger, 1999).
The results for tests of the analysts’ forecast dispersion association with
capitalization (Hypothesis 2) are reported in Table 5.
The results are consistent with Hypothesis 2 only in the OLS regressions: the
earnings forecast dispersion is lower as predicted for the firms reporting intangible
assets and holds irrespective of the stock of underlying intangible assets. None
of the estimated coefficients are significant in the 2SLS estimation. Our inter-
pretation of these findings is that a weak relationship exists between dispersion
of analysts’ forecasts and the capitalization signal. However, the 2SLS results,
which control for endogeneity between the demand for accounting information
from analysts and supply by management, suggest the relationship is secondary
to a wider information gap surrounding the firms’ future performance prospects.
This conjecture is consistent with the three sets of robust results in Table 5
that span both the OLS and 2SLS estimations. The first is that smaller firms
have more dispersed analysts’ earnings forecasts. This evidence is consistent
with the less-developed information environment surrounding smaller companies
and the higher uncertainty attending these firms’ future prospects (Agarwal and
Audretsch, 2001). Second, firms with lower underlying intangibles that are
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Table 5
Analyst average fiscal year forecast dispersion for firm i (LG(DISP/TA)) regressed on capitalized intan-
gible assets divided by underlying intangible assets (INTANG/MVAD) and other factors found to affect 
analysts’ forecast dispersion for the pooled sample (1990–1997)
Independent 
variables Sign
OLS 
Full sample
OLS 
> median 
MVAD
OLS 
< median 
MVAD
2SLS 
Full sample
2SLS 
> median 
MVAD
2SLS 
< median 
MVAD
INTANG/MVADit − −0.065 −0.343 −0.050 −0.126 −0.313 −0.046
(−2.17)* (−2.17)* (−2.23)* (−0.77) (−0.98) (−0.30)
MVAD/MVit +/− 0.173 0.045 0.406 0.192 0.030 0.418
(1.71) (0.36) (2.26)* (1.62) (0.18) (2.29)*
OP/DEBTit +/− 0.138 0.296 0.072 0.174 0.294 0.100
(1.13) (1.49) (0.50) (1.45) (1.37) (0.71)
LG(MV)it
− –0.293 −0.407 −0.232 −0.266 −0.392 −0.206
(−6.68)** (−6.69)** (−2.72)** (−7.96)** (−6.89)** (−2.82)**
AGEit +/− 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004
(2.24)* (1.43) (1.49) (2.38)** (1.43) (1.46)
EARNSDit + −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000
(−1.36) (−0.52) (−0.14) (−1.47) (−0.60) (−0.19)
LOSSit + 0.788 0.343 0.875 0.767 0.356 0.858
(4.15)** (1.49) (3.75)** (4.05)** (1.53) (3.72)**
LEVit +/− –1.395 −0.972 −1.661 −1.315 −0.941 −1.622
(−4.67)** (−2.53)* (−3.35)** (−4.25)** (−2.29)* (−3.06)**
σ2(RET)it + 0.150 0.129 0.250 0.118 0.139 0.230
1.34 (0.68) (1.80) (0.96) (0.73) (1.57)
∆PRICE +/− 0.078 −0.055 0.053
(0.77) (−0.52) (0.33)
FOLLOW − 0.012 0.012 0.009
(0.96) (0.52) (0.49)
F-statistic 
(probability)
39.73 21.60 13.83 42.09 23.32 14.94 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.73 0.63 0.72 0.74 0.64
INTANG/MVAD (or INTANG/TA) equals capitalized intangible assets divided by market value added
(or total assets) for firm i for year t; LG(DISP/TA) is the natural log of DISP/TA the standard deviation
of analysts earnings forecasts scaled by total assets for firm i for year t; MVAD equals market value
equity (calculated using balance date ordinary shares and stock price) minus book value equity which
has intangible assets subtracted for firm i for year t; MVAD/MV equals market value added divided by
equity market value for firm i for year t; OP/DEBT is operating cash divided by total liabilities for firm
i for year t; LG(MV) is natural log of market value equity for firm i for year t; AGE is the number of
years firm i has been listed; EARNSD is the standard deviation of reported earnings of firm i over
sample period; LOSS is a dummy variable equal to one for firms with earnings losses for year t and
zero otherwise; LEV is total liabilities divided by book value of equity; σ2(RET) equals the variance of
stock return rolling calculation over preceding and current years for each year the firm appears in the
sample within the sample period 1990–1997; ∆(PRICE) is equal to stock price at time t minus stock
price at time t − 1 divided by stock price at time t − 1; FOLLOW is the average number of analysts
following firm i for year t. Reported are coefficients, t-statistics, and one-tail probability where there is
a signed prediction and two-tail probability otherwise: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01). Unreported year and
industry dummies are included in the estimation. 2SLS, two stage least squares; OLS, ordinary least
squares.
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reporting earnings losses have more dispersed analysts’ earnings forecasts.
Third, firms with lower leverage have more dispersed analysts’ earnings
forecasts. Typically, lower leverage is observed for younger, earlier life-cycle
companies that have few assets in place to support the debt. These three results,
taken together, suggest that wider uncertainty about future prospects is
instrumental in generating higher dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts.
The results for the earnings forecast error relationship with the capitalization
signal from Hypothesis 2 are reported in Table 6.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we find a significant, negative relationship
between capitalization of intangibles and the absolute forecast error. We argued
previously that the capitalization signal is more relevant for firms with a stock
of underlying intangible assets and this is borne out in the forecast error results.
Specifically, the association between capitalization and lower forecast errors is
observed only for the set of firms with higher underlying intangible assets. This
result is robust across the OLS and 2SLS estimations. Hence, as expected, analysts
on average do not rely on capitalization signals from firms with low or negative
underlying intangible assets.
These results hold after controlling for a battery of uncertainty- and performance-
related factors. Furthermore, in the 2SLS results the proxy for underlying intan-
gible assets (MVAD/MV) has a significant, positive estimated coefficient. This result
is robust across the regressions. Hence, having a stock of unrecognized intangible
assets is associated with higher earnings forecast errors. Therefore, the results
suggest that firms with more certain intangible assets can help analysts, mitigat-
ing their absolute forecast errors by capitalizing some of the intangible assets.
The only other robust result in Table 6 is a negative relationship between
leverage and the level of the absolute earnings forecast error, reflecting higher
uncertainty as discussed earlier.
In summary, the hypothesis tests suggest that analyst following is higher, and
analysts’ absolute forecast error is lower, for firms with more certain underlying
intangibles that convey this information by capitalizing intangible assets. In the
absence of this signal, firms with higher underlying intangibles attract fewer
analysts and have higher earnings forecast errors. A relationship exists between
the dispersion of the analyst forecasts and the capitalization signal, but this is
secondary to a wider information gap about the firms’ future prospects. In
relation to the estimator, we find that the 2SLS results differ slightly from the
OLS results. This finding is consistent with the evidence in the literature that
analyst following, earnings forecast dispersion and errors are jointly determined
with other factors (Alford and Berger, 1999).
4.2. Additional tests
The analyst forecast dispersion and forecast error regressions were re-
estimated with the dependent variable unlogged and with deflation of the
dependent variables by the market value of equity plus debt. For the earnings
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Table 6
Analyst average fiscal year absolute forecast error for firm i (LG(| FE |/TA)) regressed on capitalized 
intangible assets divided by underlying intangible assets (INTANG/MVAD) and other factors found to 
affect analysts’ forecast errors for the pooled sample (1990–1997)
Independent 
Variables Sign
OLS 
Full sample
OLS 
> median 
MVAD
OLS 
< median 
MVAD
2SLS 
Full sample
2SLS 
> median 
MVAD
2SLS 
< median 
MVAD
INTANG/MVADit − −0.050 −0.881 –0.023 −1.356 −2.533 −0.561
(−1.17) (−1.80)* (−0.62) (−2.51)** (−3.36)** (−1.48)
MVAD/MVit +/− 0.908 0.830 1.216 1.202 1.495 1.273
(3.07)** (1.49) (3.88)** (2.93)** (2.39)** (3.44)**
OP/DEBTit +/− −0.257 0.908 −0.459 −0.319 0.610 −0.556
(−0.80) (1.19) (−1.27) (−1.00) (0.80) (−1.52)
LG(MV)it − −0.832 −0.821 −0.870 −0.893 −0.975 −0.873
(−9.36)** (−5.85)** (−4.87)** (−9.93)** (−6.04)** (−4.90)**
AGEit +/− 0.004 0.009 −0.006 0.006 0.008 −0.005
(0.99) (1.64) (−1.04) (1.16) (1.63) (−0.80)
EARNSDit + −0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001
(−0.55) (0.47) (1.41) (0.35) (1.12) (0.61)
LOSSit + 0.118 −0.024 −0.164 −0.070 0.047 −0.226
(0.37) (−0.06) (−0.38) (−0.20) (0.12) (−0.50)
LEVit +/− −2.246 −1.252 −1.687 −1.555 −1.753 −1.320
(−4.03)** (−1.55) (−2.01)* (−2.42)** (−2.03)* (−1.59)
σ2(RET)it + −0.414 −0.794 −0.052 −0.279 −0.701 0.036
(−1.23) (−1.05) (−0.13) (−0.61) (−0.99) (0.08)
∆PRICE +/− 0.432 0.048 0.421
(1.68) (0.10) (1.55)
FOLLOW − −0.036 −0.037 −0.052
(−1.46) (−0.78) (−1.49)
F-statistic 
(probability)
19.00 7.48 9.35 10.54 7.61 7.44 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.47 0.53 0.10 0.42 0.37
INTANG/MVAD (or INTANG/TA) equals capitalized intangible assets divided by market value added
(or total assets) for firm i for year t; LG(| FE |/TA) the natural log of | FE |/TA the absolute value of
earnings minus the mean earnings forecast scaled by total assets for firm i for year t; LG(DISP/TA) is
natural log of DISP/TA the standard deviation of analysts earnings forecasts scaled by total assets for
firm i for year t; MVAD equals market value equity (calculated using balance date ordinary shares and
stock price) minus book value equity which has intangible assets subtracted for firm i for year t; OP/
DEBT is operating cash divided by total liabilities for firm i for year t; LG(MV) is natural log of market
value equity for firm i for year t; AGE is the number of years firm i has been listed; EARNSD is the
standard deviation of reported earnings of firm i over sample period; LOSS is a dummy variable equal
to one for firms with earnings losses for year t and zero otherwise; LEV is total liabilities divided by
book value of equity; σ2(RET) equals the variance of stock return rolling calculation over preceding
and current years for each year the firm appears in the sample within the sample period 1990–1997;
∆(PRICE) is equal to stock price at time t minus stock price at time t − 1 divided by stock price at
time t − 1; FOLLOW is the average number of analysts following firm i for year t. Reported are
coefficients, t-statistics, and one-tail probability where there is a signed prediction and two-tail
probability otherwise: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01). Unreported year and industry dummies are included in
the estimation. 2SLS, two stage least squares; OLS, ordinary least squares.
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forecast dispersion in the OLS regressions, the unlogged dispersion variable
deflated by total assets gives the same result, as does deflation by market value
plus debt, although this result is slightly weaker. In the 2SLS, the results are the
same as reported in Table 5, except the results are weaker.
For the earnings forecast error in the OLS regressions, the unlogged analyst
forecast error deflated by total assets gives insignificant coefficients and changed
sign. The coefficient signs are negative as predicted when deflated by market value
of equity plus debt (unlogged and logged), but the coefficients are not signifi-
cant. The same results (as the primary tests) are obtained for the forecast error
2SLS regressions, irrespective of logging/not logging and whether the deflator
is total assets or the market value of equity plus debt. Overall, these additional
tests suggest some sensitivity to the choice of deflator for the dependent variable
but do not change the conclusions drawn from the main results in Section 4.1.
It is also possible that the results reported in Tables 4–6 are driven by
analysts’ propensity to follow companies making acquisitions and mergers.
Where the analyst’s firm has dual stock analysis and investment banking functions
there is a potential conflict of interest, because initial public offerings, and mergers
and acquisitions are much more lucrative than share trading.7 To evaluate this
possibility, all the regressions in Tables 4–6 are rerun with an acquisitions
variable: the number of acquisitions the sample firms made in the study period.
The results remain unchanged. The acquisition variable has a positive and sig-
nificant estimated coefficient only in the analyst following count data model for
the set of firms with higher underlying intangibles.
We also ran the two-stage least squares and ordinary least squares regressions
with other firm performance indicators, including return on assets and return on
shareholders funds with unchanged results.
Annual ordinary least squares regressions for 1990–1997 are also generally
consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2, although there are insufficient observations
to account for endogeneity effects. Analyst following is positively related to
capitalized intangibles relative to market value as predicted in 5 of the 8 years,
and is significant in 4 of these 5 years. Forecast dispersion and forecast error
are negatively related to capitalization of intangible assets in 7 of the 8 years as
predicted, and are significant in 5 and 4 of these 7 years, respectively.
5. Conclusion
January 2005 marks the transition of Australian GAAP from a set of standards
and conceptual statements promulgated by Australian accounting regulators, to
a set of standards promulgated by the International Accounting Standards
Board. The standard governing intangible assets, AASB 138 Intangible Assets
(and the international version: IAS 38 Intangible Assets), takes Australia to a
7
 For example, see http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/jan-june02/wall_street_2-27.html
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new, more restrictive regime. The restrictions will see most identifiable inter-
nally generated intangible assets removed from the balance sheet, while the
same assets acquired externally will generally be capitalized as assets. These
rules are inconsistent with the importance of intangible investment in driving
future performance (Webster, 1999), and the evidence that capitalized intangible
assets are, on average, useful to investors and meaningful numbers from an
economic perspective (Lev, 2001; Wyatt, 2005).
In this study, we provide further evidence that these restrictive rules reduce
the usefulness of financial reports focusing on the information needs of financial
analysts. This paper finds robust associations between analyst following
(positive) and forecast error (negative), and the capitalization signal for firms with
a stock of underlying intangible assets. The tests suggest a weak association
between capitalization and the analysts’ forecast dispersion (negative) that is
secondary to analysts’ wider uncertainty about the firms’ future performance.
In the US setting, Barth et al. (2001) and Barron et al. (2002) find a positive
relationship between proxies for total underlying intangible assets and higher
analyst following. McNichols and O’Brien (1997) and Francis and Willis
(2001) find that analysts prefer to follow companies expected to perform more
favourably in the future. Our study contributes additional evidence to this liter-
ature. In the Australian setting, our findings suggest that firms with higher
underlying intangibles have lower analyst following. To attract higher analyst
following, firms with more certain assets signal this fact by capitalizing intangible
assets. In the absence of this capitalization signal, firms have lower analyst
following and higher analyst forecast errors.
This evidence directly challenges the implicit assumption in AASB 138 (and
IAS 38) that capitalized intangible assets are generally not useful information.
The results suggest that analysts perceive management’s choice to capitalize
intangible assets signals more certain intangible assets. Therefore, rather than
improving the quality of financial reporting and market efficiency as claimed by
proponents of the Corporate Law Reform Program, the convergence to IAS 38
will close off a source of useful public information and, thereby, reduce the
quality of Australian financial reporting.
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